common Prudence, in the petty Concerns of private Life, suffer the smallest Part of his Property to be affected by the Opinion of a Lawyer, procured by the ex Parte Representation of his Opponent? With how much more Reason then is fuch a Rule to be rejected, where the effential Interests of a Community are concerned? But let us carry this Matter to its fullest Extent, and see what may be the Confequence of admitting fuch a Rule at all. If it is to be introduced in the prefent Instance, why is it to be excluded on any other Occasion? It ought then generally to be admitted, or not at all; because no Reason can be affigned for the Admillion of it in one Case, which may not be extended to any other. The , Rule then contended for is, that upon any Difpute between the Proprietor and People, the Proprictor is to state the Case as he thinks sit, and procure the Opinion of learned Council at home; and this being communicated to the People, is at once to filence all Objections, and to produce an implicit Acquiescence. Now even supposing the Cases to be ever so fairly stated, what would be the Consequence to the People, under the Administration of an intriguing, oppressive Proprietor? If the Opinions of Council were favourable to his Claims, no Time would be lost in communicating them to the People; but if, on the contrary, what he contended for should be thought an Invation of the Peoples Rights (the whole Bufiness between him and his Council being transacted in the most private Manner) the People would never hear a Syllable of the Matter, but the Opinions